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LOW POWER TELEVISION: A NEW
OPPORTUNITY FOR BROADCASTING IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
HO WARD B. TARKO W*
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast' television's rapid growth makes it one of American in-
dustry's more remarkable success stories. Some doubted that televi-
sion would survive its initial years,2 but statistics demonstrate that
today it is a healthy medium.3 The television station operator con-
trols a powerful tool of mass communication. TV brings a lucrative
* J.B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975; J.D., Washington University,
1982.
1. This Note concerns only broadcast television-electronic signals which trans-
mit television frequencies impressed on electromagnetic waves. By contrast, commu-
nity antenna television systems take signals off the air and deliver them to receivers
via coaxial cable. See R. NOLL, M. PECK, & J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
TELEVISION REGULATION 3, 7 (1973).
2. In 1946, NBC predicted that television would lose eight million dollars within
four years. Expensive receivers and other equipment, lack of advertising support, and
a shortage of manufacturing material discouraged some investors. Others who had
made financial commitments withdrew from the industry. BROADCASTING, Feb. 2,
1981, at 79.
3. Most households own one or more television receivers. As of January 1, 1980,
98% of the nation's homes had at least one television set. The receivers in most of
these households transmit in color. 1980 BROADCAST Y.B. D- 112. The 1980 census
revealed that more than 80 million homes have a television set. BROADCASTING, May
I1, 1981, at 40. Owners do not ignore their televisions either. The average citizen
spends almost half of every waking day, more than seven hours, watching television.
Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1980, at 1, col. 5. See also BROADCASTING, June 15, 1981, at 46
(viewers set records each month for number of hours watching television).
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commercial market of goods and services into households,4 and has
the complementary ability to transmit non-commercial messages-
news, information, and entertainment.
The technology of television has enhanced this power of station
operators. The broadcast airwaves can accommodate only a limited
number of channels.' This scarcity of frequencies has traditionally
justified a degree of government control over broadcasters that is
unique to first amendment values.' Its regulatory policy seeks to lo-
calize this limited system in order to accomplish two goals-diversifi-
cation of license holders, and maximum accessibility to potential
4. Advertisers recognize the size of television's audience, and spend large sums of
money each year to promote goods and services to viewers. In 1980, the top 50 broad-
cast advertising agencies spent $750 million more on television than they did in 1979.
This increase, however, did not match the one billion dollar gain in 1979 over 1978.
Id. Jan. 26, 1981, at 30. As a result of these expenditures, the three commercial net-
works have collected record revenues. Their advertising sales topped five billion dol-
lars in 1980, a 9.5% increase over 1979. fd. Feb. 9, 1981, at 7.
5. See NOLL, PECK, & McGOWAN, supra note 1, at 4 for a further explanation of
broadcast frequencies.
6. In view of the shortage of frequencies, the law has conferred status on those
who control television. The federal government licenses broadcasters as "trustees" of
the airwaves for the benefit of the public. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). Licensees must
prove every five years that they deserve another term of operation. Id. § 307(d), as
amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 1241(a)(2), 95 Stat. 357. The Supreme Court has upheld this licensing scheme be-
cause of the technological limit on frequencies. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also Office of Telecommunications of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a further
discussion of the history of broadcast regulation, see notes 17-52 and accompanying
text infra.
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to administer
broadcast regulations. See note 30 and accompanying text infra. Currently, the FCC
is challenging the traditional theory of trusteeship. Chairman Mark S. Fowler says he
will work to deregulate television and allow "marketplace" forces to control broad-
cast service. See BROADCASTiNG, Sept. 28, 1981, at 19; id. Sept. 21, 1981, at 23.
While the FCC under Chairman Fowler may take important new approaches to
broadcast regulation, see note 106 infra, others have long argued that the current sys-
tem does not work. For example, one scholar believes it unrealistic to classify broad-
casters as "public trustees." Professor Jaffe says justice to the licensee, and the reality
of the broadcast industry's structure, should and do shape renewal policies. He be-
lieves that the FCC must treat licensees fairly, by allowing them to rely on the agency
for periodic renewal. Jaffe, WHDH. The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82
HARv. L. Rnv. 1693 (1969).
This Note agrees with Professor Jaffe that television ownership patterns have made
it unrealistic for the FCC, Congress, and the courts to hold licensees to a fiduciary
standard. The FCC's tolerance of this situation, however, deserves analysis and
criticism.
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users.
7
Government regulation has not, however, achieved its goal of local
control. Licensees have accumulated multiple holdings of broadcast
properties' which in turn rely heavily on the three commercial net-
works for most of their daily programming.9 These ownership pat-
terns, which effectively have stripped residents of their ability to
operate television stations, have proved especially troublesome in
metropolitan areas."° Often, owners absent from the cities that their
stations serve may not respond to the needs of diverse populations.
Instead, television's economic dependence on advertising requires it
to present programs suited for mass tastes which deliver large audi-
ences to commercial sponsors."
This Note examines television's failure to achieve its twin regula-
tory goals of diversified control and maximum access in urban areas.
Section II presents an overview of the origin and purpose of broad-
cast regulation. 2 Section III analyzes the government's failure to use
its powerful regulatory tool-the license renewal-to help television
achieve the regulatory objectives.' 3 This Note concludes that the cur-
rent system of broadcasting offers no hope for those seeking control
over, and access to, television in metropolitan areas. Finally, it
presents and analyzes a new broadcast service, low power television
(LPTV). 4 LPTV has the potential to open hundreds, and perhaps
thousands of new channels on metropolitan television airwaves 15 that
7. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 653 (1970).
8. See notes 154-57 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 158-60 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 156 and accompanying text infra.
11. NOLL, PECK, & McGOWAN, supra note 1, at 112. See also Business Execu-
tives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcast system favors status quo and bland commercialism);
Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring) (growth of
media conglomerates will likely produce more bland and homogeneous fare).
12. See notes 17-52 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 53-182 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 183-222 and accompanying text infra.
15. Supporters also expect LPTV to improve television in rural areas that cur-
rently have little or no local service. Urban-based groups, however, have inundated
the agency with applications and requests for information on LPTV. See note 196
and accompanying text infra. This Note focuses on the potential for LPTV to supple-
ment the television service already provided in metropolitan areas.
19821
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until now appeared saturated with stations.1 6
II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF BROADCAST REGULATION
The early years of radio broadcasting in the United States were
chaotic. Operators roamed the radio band, transmitting signals that
often interfered with another broadcaster using the same frequency.
1 7
Prolonged studies demonstrated that this situation was depriving the
public of clear, dependable service."8 Congress responded by passing
the Federal Radio Act of 1927'1 which dramatically changed the de-
velopment of the industry.20 Congress made broadcasting a privi-
lege,21 subordinating an operator's freedom of transmission to the
public's right to receive uninterrupted radio service.22 To accomplish
16. The top 100 markets have no available VHF channels, and the supply of less
profitable UHF frequencies is dwindling. B. COMPAINE, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?
CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 65
(1979). The high value of these stations complicates this shortage because in the rare
instance of a licensee selling its facility, the cost is prohibitive for most. See notes 47
and 51 and accompanying text infra.
17. Several authors have recounted the turmoil in radio broadcasting prior to fed-
eral legislation that regulated the medium. See, e.g., C. DILL, RADIO LAW 68-75
(1938); E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 8-
13 (2d ed. 1978); L. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION ITS HISTORY,
ACTrVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 9-10 (1932).
18. Congress had struggled for 50 years to control radio. The industry, with judi-
cial blessings, had ignored earlier legislation which regulated frequencies and hours
of operation. After a series of national radio conferences in the early 1920's, the frus-
trated Commerce Secretary, Herbert Hoover, abandoned the idea of federal regula-
tory control over radio, issuing instead an unheeded plea for self-restraint. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. at 375, n.4.
19. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
20. Until Congress acted, radio communication ownership was left to private en-
terprise. The government did not participate in the allocation, assignment, or use of
broadcast frequencies. See KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 17, at 9. The new
Federal Radio Act created for the federal government a major role in radio commu-
nications. Congress stated that its legislative policy would "maintain the control of
the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission."
The law created a licensing scheme, requiring operators to renew their broadcast per-
mits every three years. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (1927).
21. Congress stated that a licensed broadcaster would have a significantly dimin-
ished interest compared to operators prior to regulation. The statute read: "no such
license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the term, conditions, and peri-
ods of the license." Id. at 1162.
22. The sponsor of the Radio Act said: "(T)he right of the public to service is
superior to the right of any individual. . . . (")he broadcasting privilege will not be a
right of selfishness." 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (remarks of Rep. White).
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this goal, the statute created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC),2 3
an administrative agency designed to restore peace to the airwaves
through a systematic allocation of frequencies. 4 The FRC assigned
only as many broadcast licenses as the airwaves could accommodate
without service interruptions.2" This system of limited access forced
the FRC to grant licenses based on competing applications for a fre-
quency.26 The FRC granted licenses to those candidates it believed
would best meet the statutory goal of broadcasting in the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity.27
Seven years after passing the Federal Radio Act, Congress rewrote
the law, enacting the Communications Act of 1934.28 The new law
extended congressional policymaking and regulatory authority to
various forms of communications.29 It also replaced the FRC with
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),3° but incorporated
virtually all of the old radio legislation. 3 The new law reiterated the
broadcaster's privilege to transmit,32 and the public's right to receive
an undisturbed signal.33 The Act also required the licensee to prove
every three years34 that it deserved another term.35 In FCC v. Pots-
23. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 3, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927).
24. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
279 (1933) (upheld the authority of Congress and its new agency to administer na-
tional broadcast policy as a function of interstate commerce).
25. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163-64 (1927).
26. Id. § 9, at 1166.
27. Id. § 4, at 1163.
28. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
29. See generally id See also KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 17.
30. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
32. Id. at § 151.
33. ld. at § 301.
34. Id. at § 307(d), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241(a)(2), 95 Stat. 357. This amendment extended the license
period to five years.
35. Id. The renewal requirement effects the statutory policy that specifies that a
license grants to an operator use, but not ownership, of the designated frequency. 47
U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940) (the policy of the act makes clear that no person has anything in the nature of a
property right resulting from the grant of a license).
1982]
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ville Broadcasting Co.,36 and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,"'
the Supreme Court upheld this statutory scheme.38 The Court reaf-
firmed the power of a federal administrative agency to subordinate
the economic interests of licensees to the public's right to the efficient
use of the airwaves. 9
Today, the FCC enjoys broad discretion to regulate broadcasting
as Congress intended in the Communications Act of 1934.40 The
agency's flexibility stems in part from the vagueness of the statutory
standard---"public interest, convenience, and necessity"-for mea-
suring acceptable broadcast service.4 1 The Supreme Court's most im-
portant, modem communication law decision firmly supports this
regulatory system. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States,42
36. Id. at 134.
37. Id. at 470.
38. In Pottsville, the Court upheld the FCC's power to review license applications
for operating permits. Id. at 145. In Sanders Bros., the Court said the limited
number of broadcast frequencies required applicants to prove that they could compe-
tently and adequately serve the public. The Court cited this scarcity rationale to up-
hold the policy and procedures involved in broadcast licensing. Id. at 475.
39. In Sanders Bros., the Court held that the FCC could ignore the economic
consequences that the grant of a new license might have on an existing service. Id. at
476. The Court said that Congress wrote the law to pratect the public through effi-
cient allocations of frequencies, not to protect licensees from each other. But see Car-
roll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (FCC should
consider economic consequences of new station if insufficient local revenue to support
two stations threatens to eliminate all service).
40. The Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969) remains the leading interpretation of the Communications Act. After
tracing the history of federal communications policy, Justice White described as a
"venerable principle" that an agency Congress creates to administer a law deserves
deference "absent compelling indications that it is wrong. . . ." Id. at 381. Justice
White recognized that government regulation of broadcasting is a delicate matter be-
cause it risks intrusion on first amendment values. He stated, "the FCC is free to
implement [its policies] by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridg-
ment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by ... the
Act." Id. at 382.
41. Congress did not define its notion of "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity." Presumably, the drafters intended that this standard would guide the FCC in
effecting the statutory goal of making communications available to all people rapidly
and efficiently. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). This goal of making broadcasting univer-
sally available pervades the FCC's procedures for allocating television frequencies
throughout the country. See notes 134-40 and accompanying text infra. See also Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. at 385 (the Communications Act is
not notable for the precision of its substantive standards).
42. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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the Court reaffirmed the government's power to restrain broadcasters
from monopolizing the airwaves when technology cannot accommo-
date the demand for communication outlets.43 Some commentators
have argued that Red Lion blessed a system" that wrongfully in-
trudes on a first amendment right to broadcast.45 The Court insisted,
however, that the only freedom at issue was the public's right of ac-
cess to "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."' 46  The Court con-
cluded that Congress could guarantee that right by licensing users of
the scarce frequencies.47
43. Id. at 390.
44. RedLion upheld the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine", which requires broadcasters
to present a reasonable amount of balanced discussion on public issues. See Fairness
Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974). Ten years after the FCC adopted the Fairness Doc-
trine, Congress incorporated the rule into the Communications Act. Pub. L. No. 86-
274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)). For a
history of FCC action and case law on the Fairness Doctrine, see American Sec.
Council Ed. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 443-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
45. Justice Douglas argued that broadcasting deserves the same freedom from
government intrusion that the print media enjoy. He found it intolerable that the
FCC could demand licensees to account for their programming:
The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime. It puts the
head of the camel inside the tent and enables administration after administration
to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends. In
1973-as in other years--there is clamoring to make TV and radio emit the
messages that console certain groups. There are charges that these mass media
are too slanted, too partisan, too hostile in their approach to candidates and the
issues.
The same cry of protest has gone up against the newspapers and
magazines .... Under our Bill of Rights people are entitled to have extreme
ideas, silly ideas, partisan ideas.
The same is true, I believe, of TV and radio. At times they have a nauseating
mediocrity. At other times they show the dazzling brilliance of a Leonard Bern-
stein; and they very often bring humanistic influences of far-away people into
every home.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154-55
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (dissent of Judge
Bazelon).
46. 395 U.S. at 390.
47. Id. at 389. Concededly, the composition of the mass media has changed since
Congress wrote the Communications Act based on the scarcity theory. Currently,
almost 9,000 radio stations and more than 1,000 television stations broadcast in the
United States, compared to less than 1,700 newspapers that publish daily. BROAD-
CASTING, Mar. 16, 1981, at 51. See also Geller, First.4mendment and Electronic Me-
di." Raising the Issues, 5 Black L. J. 353, 364-65 (1977).
Justice Douglas also disagreed that the need for engineering expertise to avoid sig-
nal interference justified broadcast regulations. "Who at this time would have the
1982]
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If "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" requires access to broad-
cast outlets for as many voices as possible, the FCC has failed to
carry out congressional policy. Despite the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the statute in Pottsville, Sanders Bros., and Red Lion, the
FCC has not used its licensing power to diversify control of the scarce
channels.4" The agency's policy instead favors incumbent licensees
with a "renewal expectancy" that makes meritorious, competing ap-
plications a futile exercise in paperwork.49
Most parties that are unable to obtain a license through the FCC's
conduct of licensing and renewal hearings are also frustrated if they
attempt to purchase an operating broadcast facility in the market.
The short supply of available channels in metropolitan areas 50 has
inflated the purchase price for facilities so that only the very wealthy
can afford to buy into a license.5' Interested parties that otherwise
folly to think he could combat the New York Times or Denver Post by building a new
plant and becoming a competitor?" Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 159 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974).
The abundance of broadcast stations compared with the number of daily newspa-
pers does not justify the conclusions that channels are plentiful and control is unnec-
essary. In metropolitan areas, where mass media may inadequately meet the needs of
diverse populations, the important statistic is that the number of stations far exceeds
the number of operators. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 662. See also notes 154-56 and
accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 131-64 and accompanying text infra.
49. See generally notes 53-182 and accompanying text infra.
50. Sixty-one VHF channels (2-13) are available nationwide. All are outside the
top 100 markets, and only six are in the top 200 markets. The UHF band (14-70) is a
bit looser, where potential licensees may choose from 86 channels in the top 100 mar-
kets. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE Low POWER TELEVISION INQUIRY,
Sept. 9, 1980, at 56 [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. UHF emerged only recently as a
good investment for broadcast licensees. In 1952, the FCC forced UHF channels to
compete with their VHF counterparts, though few television sets at the time received
the UHF signal. UHF also requires more power to overcome geographic barriers to
its signal. Improving technology, and congressional action requiring television sets to
receive UHF, have made the service more competitive. Id.
51. Until recently, an urban VHF station sold for between $50 and $100 million.
Those offers, however, pale next to the record $220 million that Metromedia, Inc.
recently agreed to pay for a single broadcast property-WCVB-TV in Boston. Boston
ranks sixth in the nation in market size. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 27. The
licensing and programming history of WCVB, formerly WHDH, are legendary in
broadcast law. See notes 89-98 and accompanying text infra.
Modem sale prices for urban UHF stations reflect their improved market position.
Purchasers have recently paid approximately $11 million each for UHF facilities in
Houston, Cleveland, and Kansas City. Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1977, p. 6, col. I. See also
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 112.
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qualify under the FCC's relatively simple ownership criteria52 lack
both available outlets and, most likely, the capital to buy out an ex-
isting licensee.
In summary, FCC license policies have effectively barred diversity
in television ownership. Why did the current system fail, despite
Congress' intent to offer the broadcast consumer the maximum possi-
ble diversity of programming in a technologically limited situation?
The answer requires a closer study of the FCC's treatment of license
renewal applications.
III. LICENSE RENEWALS
A. Procedure
1. The Origin of the Comparative Hearing
The FCC derives the power to approve original and renewal
broadcast licenses that will serve the standard of "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" from two sections53 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.34 If the agency finds that an application raises "a
substantial and material question of fact"55 of compliance with the
standard, it must first conduct a hearing. 6
One such situation occurred in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,57
when two companies applied for licenses in a geographical area to
operate on the same frequency. Both applicants qualified for the
52. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1976) requires the applicant to meet minimal require-
ments of "citizenship, character, financial, technical, and other qualifications" to op-
erate a station. The FCC then grants the license if the award is in the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity." Id. at § 309(a). The FCC, however, does not necessarily
rubber stamp applications. In Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962), the court affirmed the FCC's rejection of the only appli-
cant for a new radio station in New Jersey. The candidate made no effort to deter-
mine the community's program needs. Instead, it offered the same program plan that
it had used at its other stations in two distant states.
53. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(a), 309(a) (1976).
54. Id. at § 151.
55. Id. at § 309(e).
56. id. Qualified contestants for the same broadcast frequency present their cases
at these hearings. The FCC, however, must subordinate the candidates' interests to
the public's. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. at 137-38.
57. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
58. One company sought to build a new station to operate on the frequency.
While the FCC was reviewing that application, an existing licensee filed an applica-
1982]
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same permit, making them "actually (mutually) exclusive."5 9 After
approving the competitor's application, the FCC set Ashbacker's for
hearing. 0 The D.C. Circuit6" dismissed Ashbacker's appeal of the
order,62 but the Supreme Court reversed.63 The Court emphasized
that the statute provides the procedural guarantee of a hearing for
mutually exclusive candidates before the FCC may issue a license.
4
When choosing between candidates, the agency must determine
which candidate would better serve the public interest, convenience,
and necessity.65 The Court recognized that an applicant must prove
a more difficult case to displace an established licensee than when it
opposes a newcomer for the same license.66 Thus, the Court held
that if the FCC grants one application and effectively precludes the
other, "the statutory right to a hearing which Congress has accorded
applicants before denial of their applications becomes an empty
thing."' 67 The Court also reiterated its holding in Pottsville and Sand-
ers Bros. that the FCC would violate the statutory intent of the Com-
munications Act by granting to a licensee a "vested interest" in a
frequency. 68 Thus, while.Ashbacker involved competing applications
for a new frequency, the Court said the statute required the FCC to
apply the same procedures to renewal applications.69
The Court's landmark decision in Ashbacker7 ° forced the FCC to
tion to change its operation to the same frequency. The FCC said this "would result
in intolerable interference to both applicants." Id. at 328.
59. Mutually exclusive applicants are parties that qualify for one broadcast chan-
nel. The FCC will conduct a hearing to determine which applicant best qualifies to
receive the license. See notes 78-88 and accompanying text infra.
60. 326 U.S. at 328.
61. Aggrieved parties before the FCC have a statutory right to appeal an adverse
decision to the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976). As this Note discusses later,
that court plays an important role in shaping broadcast policy.
62. The lower court dismissed Ashbacker's appeal without publishing an opinion.
326 U.S. at 329.
63. Id. at 334.
64. Id. at 333.
65. Id. at 329, citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1940) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(a) (1976)).
66. 326 U.S. at 332.
67. Id. at 330.
68. Id. at 331.
69. Id. at 332.
70. Twenty-five years after.Ashbacker, the FCC attempted to eliminate compara-
tive hearings in license renewal contests. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text
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evaluate mutually exclusive license applicants without congressional
guidance. The statute does not define the vague "public interest, con-
venience, and necessity" standard. 7' Thus, the FCC developed crite-
ria for meeting the statutory standard. 72 Despite its efforts to define
the standard, the FCC in its early years allowed the applicants to
control the tenor of the licensing hearings by accepting the most at-
tractive evidence proffered." In other words, the FCC followed the
Ashbacker mandate to conduct hearings, but its policy in renewal
proceedings rewarded an incumbent for three years of satisfactory
performance. Despite the congressional intent in enacting the stat-
ute, 7 and the Supreme Court's consistent interpretations, 75 the FCC
rejected challengers to renewal applications who fared better in the
comparative contest.76 For incumbent licensees, periodic renewal be-
came a simple exercise in paperwork, despite the specific language of
the Communications Act to allow broadcasters "the use of such chan-
nels, but not the ownership thereof.. . .
2. Establishment, and Retreat from Meaningful Review
After twenty years of inconsistently applying the comparative
infra. The D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's alternative proposal to automatically re-
new licensees that had performed satisfactorily. The court said this plan ignored
Congress' intent in enacting the statute and ran contrary to the Ashbacker precedent.
The court called Ashbacker and subsequent consistent holdings "perhaps the most
important series of cases in American administrative law." Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
71. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
72. For a discussion of the FCC's early experience with licensing criteria, see
Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L. REv. 479
(1959).
73. Id.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
75. See notes 38-39, 57-69, and accompanying text supra.
76. The FCC established its bias for incumbents in two leading renewal decisions.
See Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963); Hearst Radio, Inc.
(WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951). See also South Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349
F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965). In the latter case, the
court affirmed the FCC's award of a license to a temporary operator who scored be-
low its challenger in a comparative hearing. Judge Wright argued in dissent that this
pro-incumbent bias violated the statute's hearing requirement, converted the broad-
cast license privilege into a private right, and would inflate the price of urban stations.
Id. at 973 (Wright, J., dissenting). His prophecy on the purchase price of broadcast
properties was accurate. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
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hearing requirement, the FCC adopted its Policy Statement on Com-
parative Broadcast Hearings (1965 Policy Statement).7" The FCC re-
viewed the various criteria it had applied in earlier proceedings, and
formed a cohesive, dependable hearing procedure for comparing mu-
tually exclusive candidates for new frequencies.79 The FCC intended
that this new hearing would single out the applicant that would
(1) provide the best practicable service to the public; and (2) de-
crease the concentration of media ownership.8" The FCC said that it
would select the applicant that would best achieve these goals by con-
sidering six objective factors: (1) whether the applicant owned other
communication outlets;81 (2) whether the ownership would take part
in station operation;82 (3) proposed programming;8 3 (4) the appli-
cant's previous broadcast record;8 4 (5) whether the station would use
78. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
79. Id. at 393, n.l.
80. Id. at 394.
81. Id. at 394-95. Diversification is "a factor of primary significance" but be-
comes less important when an applicant's other media holdings are far from the loca-
tion of the disputed station. The FCC has separate rules for multiple and newspaper
holdings that it designed to curb the concentration of ownership. See notes 147-53
and accompanying text infra.
82. 1 F.C.C.2d at 395-96. The FCC considers ownership involvement, or "man-
agement integration," a factor of substantial importance. The policy presumes that
licensees who live in the communities that their stations serve will understand the
area's needs and interests and program accordingly. Diversification and integration
are complementary policies because spreading control should increase the number of
owner-managers. Id. at 395.
83. Id. at 397. The FCC requires the applicant to show a superior commitment to
public service before it will consider taking evidence at the hearing on proposed pro-
gramming. The proponent must also demonstrate that its programs will serve the
community's perceived needs. The FCC adopted this policy to keep hearing records
"free of immaterial clutter." Chapman Radio & Television Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 213, 214-
15 (1967). Ironically, the FCC has downgraded at least one extraordinary program
proposal it thought the applicant could not possibly implement. See notes 97-98 and
accompanying text infra See also Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351,
359 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (programming is the essence of broadcasting in the public
interest).
84. 1 F.C.C.2d at 398. The FCC supposedly limits its consideration of past per-
formance to unusually good or bad records. In such cases, the FCC believes past
performance most reliably predicts the quality of an applicant's future performance.
The FCC claims it ignores average records because it expects at least average per-
formance from all licensees. The FCC has since sought to make satisfactory perform-
ance the only requirement for license renewal. See notes 100 and 120 and
accompanying text infra. Some Congressmen support the agency's proposal. See
notes 99 and 106 and accompanying text infra.
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the frequency efficiently; 5 and (6) the applicant's character. s6
Originally the FCC intended to apply these criteria only in hear-
ings to award new licenses.8 7 Subsequently, the Commissioners an-
nounced they would apply these measures in comparative hearings
on renewal applications."8 The FCC shocked the broadcast indus-
try89 when it used the comparative criteria to deny an incumbent's
90
renewal application in WHDH, Inc.9
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's WHDH, Inc. holding in
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,92 agreeing that the chal-
lenger ranked superior in both the diversification of control93 and
local ownership categories.94 After finding that the incumbent did
not match these structural qualifications, the court also agreed that
the FCC appropriately did not consider the station's averagepastper-
formance. 5 The court also rejected the incumbent's argument that
85. 1 F.C.C.2d at 398.
86. Id. at 399. See also 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1976).
87. 1 F.C.C.2d at 393, n.j.
88, Seven (7) League Productions, Inc., I F.C.C.2d 1597, 1598 (1965).
89. The FCC previously had renewed all licenses, absent a showing of operator
misconduct. One commentator predicted the WHDH decision would send the broad-
casting industry into turmoil, causing serious financial harm to licensees who had
relied on renewal expectancies to invest confidently in their stations. He cited a
broadcast trade publication that predicted WHDH would jeopardize three billion
dollars worth of licenses. Jaffe, supra note 6. History has since proven these fears
groundless. See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
90. The FCC did not treat the case as a renewal proceeding, though the challeng-
ers were contesting an entrenched licensee. The FCC placed the incumbent on proba-
tion, pending the outcome of the litigation. Commissioners evaluated the licensee as
a new candidate, rather than as a renewal applicant.
91. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aYdsub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (197 1),rehearing denied, 404
U.S. 877 (1971).
92. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 877 (1971).
93. Id. at 860. A Boston newspaper publisher held the license. The court said
that had different parties controlled the newspaper and television station, a "bother-
some" editorial decision would not have developed. The station delayed broadcast-
ing an investigative story published in the newspaper because of the "scoop" value of
the report. The court also suggested that the station did not editorialize on matters of
public interest, fearing attacks from its competitors. Id.
94. Id. at 863. Six of the leading challenger's shareholders promised to serve full-
time in station management; two had significant television experience. Id. at 847.
95. Id. at 855. The court conceded that to encourage continued quality, the law
would tolerate some renewal expectancies for stations providing "superior" service.
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the FCC violated the incumbent's due process rights by stripping its
license.96 Ironically, the successful challenger rated below yet an-
other applicant in the proposed programming category because it
failed to prove it could produce an extraordinary amount of original
shows.97 The winner eventually proved its critics wrong.9"
While the D.C. Circuit was considering Greater Boston, Congress
responded to the broadcast industry's alarm over the WHDH, Inc.
decision. Amendments proposed to the licensing procedures in the
Communications Act would have rewarded incumbents with auto-
matic renewal for good faith performance.99 The sponsors withdrew
the bill after the FCC adopted similar provisions in revised guide-
lines for renewal challenges." °° The D.C. Circuit, however, vacated
the new policy and ordered the FCC to return to comparative hear-
ings for renewal challenges. In Citizens Communications Center v.
Id. at 854. The court said, however, that the FCC should do more to serve the public
interest than passively renew average broadcast licenses. Id. at 860.
96. Id. at 850.
97. Id. at 847. The challenger promised that more than one-third of its weekly
programs would be local and originate live. The court called this a "brave general-
ity." Id. at 848. At the time, that observation was probably accurate, considering the
domination of the networks over total air time. See notes 158-60 and accompanying
text infra.
98. The successful challenger, Better Boston Broadcasters, Inc., subsequently pro-
duced 53 hours of local programs each week, far exceeding its competitors in the
commercial television industry. It developed newsmagazine shows, "realistic
sitcoms" on current social issues that it followed with discussions on the programs,
experimental films, and Spanish-language and black-oriented programming. It pro-
duced programs on health and education that are syndicated in more than 40 cities.
Many believe that the station's program innovations have helped to improve the over-
all quality and competition in Boston television. Its manager attributed this unusual
record to the station's desire "to do good television." One member of the station's
board of directors retorted that the station is not that good-the others are worse.
Wall St. J., May 26, 1977, p. 1, col. 1. BBB, Inc., ended any doubts about the profit-
ability of locally originated programs. It recently agreed to sell its facility for the
highest price ever paid for a broadcast property. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
99. See, e.g., S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
100. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Re-
newal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), vacated sub nom, Citizens Communica-
tions Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarfled, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir.
1972) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Policy Statement]. The FCC adopted a two-step ap-
proach to renewal proceedings. If the incumbent could demonstrate "substantial past
performance," the FCC would renew the license without considering the comparative
merits of the challenger. Id. at 424-26.
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FCC,"° I the court declared that Greater Boston had repudiated a past
performance standard as a measure of future performance. 1 2
The tension continues between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit over
the appropriate standard of review for license renewal applications.
The agency has mostly ignored the structural criteria of the 1965 Pol-
icy Statement endorsed by the court in Greater Boston and Citizens
Communications Center. Instead the FCC has applied a performance
standard" 3 leaving the comparative hearing a dead end for license
challenges."° The FCC has paid extraordinary deference to incum-
bent licensees, 10 5 effectively creating a property right in what Con-
101. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1972), clarpifed, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
court said that limiting license challenges to complaints about performance, and pro-
viding a hearing only for serious deficiencies runs against both section 309(e) and
Ashbacker. Id. at 1210.
102. Id. at 1208. "The policy violates the clear intent of the Communications Act
that the award of a broadcasting license should be a public trust.. . . By whatever
name or classification, broadcasters are temporary permittees---fiduciaries--of a great
public resource." Id. at 1214 & n.39, quoting Office of Telecommunications of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
103. In 1952, Congress amended § 307(d), eliminating the requirement that the
FCC treat a renewal decision like an original application. Communications Act
Amendments, 1952, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 879, § 5, 66 Stat. 711, 714 (amending Com-
munications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1084).
The present language requires the FCC to judge all candidates under "the public
interest, convenience, and necessity" standard. While the Act still precludes any pref-
erence for incumbents (see, e.g., § 301), the courts and the FCC inferred that Con-
gress did not intend to bar incumbents from presenting performance-related evidence.
See Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 41, n.4, amended, 598 F.2d 58
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom. Cowles Broadcasting, Inc. v. Central Fla.
Enterprises, Inc., 441 U.S. 957 (1979). See also Note, Communications Law-Commu-
nications Act of 1934-In a Comparative Renewal Hearing the FCC May Not Create a
Bias in Favor of Renewal, but Must Use Criteria that Afford a Challenger a Full Com-
parison, Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1205, 1210
(1979).
104. In the year after the FCC stripped WHDH of its license, opponents filed only
eight challenges to 250 renewals. During the short-lived term of the pro-renewal 1970
Policy Statement, no incumbents faced opposition. Citizens Communications Center,
v. FCC, 447 F.2d at 1214, n.37. In its history, the FCC has revoked or failed to renew
only 150 licenses, mostly those of small radio stations, for reasons unrelated to per-
formance. B. COLE & M. OETrINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND
THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE 200 (1978).
105. See note 104 and accompanying text supra. See also note 120 and accompa-
nying text infra.
The Supreme Court has authorized the FCC to make the initial decision on what
policies serve the public interest. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978). Presumably, this gives the FCC discretion when consider-
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gress originally intended to be a privilege. 0 6
Several factors may explain the FCC's reluctance to disturb broad-
cast ownership in comparative renewal hearings. First, many Com-
missioners join the agency after enjoying successful careers in the
industry.0 7 Thus, they may sympathize more with the incumbent's
ing a broadcaster's record. It also makes the FCC the best judge of when it is in the
public interest to dismiss a challenger in favor of renewal expectancy.
106. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(d) (1976); Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598
F.2d 37, 60, n.18, amended, 598 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub non.
Cowles Broadcasting, Inc. v. Central Fla. Enters., Inc., 441 U.S. 957 (1979) (Commu-
nications Act disfavors vested license rights to encourage diverse and antagonistic
sources of information); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 61
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (FCC measures licensee's perform-
ance at renewal time, but should give prime consideration to its effectiveness as a
public trustee of the airwaves).
The FCC has asked Congress to settle the conflict between its view of regulatory
policies and the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Communications Act. The FCC
under Chairman Fowler has prepared a legislative package for Congress that substan-
tialy rewrites the Communications Act of 1934. The new proposal would change the
law's emphasis on broadcaster accountability, making the availability of broadcast
services to the public dependent on "relevant marketplace forces." This marketplace
theory would apply on both large and small scales. First, the FCC would no longer
distribute service equitably to all areas, but would let public demand dictate the loca-
tion of the station. Thus, the new law would undercut the primary goal of the original
broadcast legislation that has survived to this day. See notes 137-38 and accompany-
ing text infra. Second, the legislation proposes to eliminate the structural comparative
hearing for renewal licenses in favor of automatic renewal for those who met certain
standards of performance during their license terms. Fowler says the scarcity the-
ory-which has always justified government allocation of licensing to regulate broad-
casting in the public interest-has lost its validity in view of the new technologies that
have opened new channels. Commissioner Fogarty dissented, saying most of the
technologies "are on the horizon. . . .Today there is still scarcity and I am regulating
for today." BROADCASTINo, Sept. 21, 1981, at 23.
The FCC initiative will receive some sympathetic reaction in Congress. A bill au-
thored primarily by Senators Cannon (D-Nev.) and Packwood (R-Ore.) contains pro-
visions similar to the FCC's proposals for a "pro-competitive" attitude in broadcast
regulation, and automatic renewal for licensees with satisfactory performance records.
Telephone interview with Jack Lee, Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, in Washington, D.C., (Oct. 26,
1981). See also BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 24.
107. According to information gathered by a House of Representatives subcom-
mittee between 1960 and 1976, more than half of the newly appointed FCC Commis-
sioners came from business or law practices devoted to furthering the interests of the
broadcast industry. Another study found that two-thirds of the Commissioners who
left the FCC went to work for companies in agency-regulated inidustries, or practiced
before the agency as attorneys or engineers. Four of the nine Commissioners who left
the FCC between January 1970, and June, 1977, went into broadcasting. Conflict of
Interest in Regulatory Agencies, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
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position than with the challenger's proposal in a license hearing. Sec-
ond, the FCC is a political agency that interacts daily with broadcast-
ers and their lobbyists on a variety of issues. This continuing
relationship may make the FCC more amenable to the interests of
incumbent licensees."' 8 Third, the FCC believes that renewal expec-
tancies for satisfactory service stabilize the broadcast industry.1"9
Licensees must be assured of renewal to invest confidently in their
facilities and programming. Finally, the comparative hearing can be
a long, expensive procedure,"' requiring the challenger to make a
serious commitment of resources."' WHDH, Inc. remains the only
FCC decision that ousted an incumbent licensee in a comparative
hearing." 2 The administrative and judicial litigation lasted fifteen
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1977). See COLE & OETTINGER, supra note 104, at 5, 8. The authors noted that
with potential employment waiting in the industry, " [C]ommissioners naturally avoid
fouling the nest to which they may fly. Nor are industry representatives reluctant to
remind them." Id. at 8.
108. KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 17, at 14, 38-39. Mr. Krasnow represents
the National Association of Broadcasters, the powerful trade organization of the in-
dustry. He suggests that the industry, not the FCC, determines broadcast regulatory
policy. Mr. Krasnow says the agency and its staff cannot realistically insulate them-
selves from the industry, because they interact on a daily basis through consultants,
joint committees, a powerful trade press, the Federal Communications Bar Associa-
tion, social contacts, frequent office visits, trade associations, submission of pleadings,
and oral arguments. The FCC, consequently, views broadcast policy in industry
terms. Id.
109. 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 100, at 424-25. This argument suggests
that renewing the licensee who has a proven record, rather than risking the license on
an applicant with uncertain ability, best serves the public interest. See FCC v. Na-
tional Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1978). See also 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Others see no reason to fear disruption of quality service, be-
cause eager applicants usually emerge for the right to operate the facility. COLE &
OETTINGER, supra note 104, at 200-01.
110. Attorneys for incumbent licensees understand the use of stall tactics which
help to contribute to oppressively large and expensive hearing records. For example,
early in the WHDH proceeding, "one attorney went so far as to question an applicant
about the absence of noise insulation in the toilet facilities in that applicant's pro-
posed studio." Grunewald, Should the Comparative Hearing Process be Retained in
Television Licensing?, 13 AM. U.L. REv. 164, 165-66 (1963).
111. Id.
112. While the FCC has not held another hearing like the WHDH proceeding,
the case stirred action in Congress. Supporters of renewal expectancy introduced 178
bills in the 94th Congress to make broadcasters' status in the Communications Act
more secure. See Krasnow & Robb, Telecommunications and the 94th Congress: An
Overview ofMajor CongressionalActions, 29 FED. CoM. B. J. 117, 139 (1976). For the
text of two of these proposals, see FCC Broadcast License RenewalReform: Two Coin-
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years.1 13
After reflecting on the WHDH story, one critic attacked the stat-
ute, rather than the FCC's procedures. 1 4 He opined that a regula-
tory agency cannot develop an acceptable method to establish
standards for judging broadcast performance." 5  For example, in
Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc.,"6 former FCC Chairman Richard
Wiley believed the incumbent deserved another license term on the
basis of a satisfactory record of performance. 1 7 After a bitter com-
parative hearing, however, Wiley voted against renewal because the
challenger had superior structural qualifications." 8 Wiley said the
case demonstrates that the FCC cannot possibly apply objective stan-
dards in a subjective decision as to which applicant would better
serve the public interest in quality broadcasting." 9 Wiley stated he
would rather concede automatic renewal to licensees who faithfully
performed during their previous term.' 20 At least one other former
FCC Commissioner shares Wiley's concerns about the agency's com-
ments on Recent Legislative Proposals, 42 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 67, 69-72 (1973).
Many of these former bills resemble the Cannon-Packwood proposal to end the com-
parative hearing process and allow for automatic license renewal in most cases. See
note 106 and accompanying text supra.
113. For a summary of the amazing case history of WHDH, see Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 844-46 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 877 (1971).
114. See Jaffe, supra note 6.
115. Id. at 1700.
116. 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), reconsideration denied, 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977), re-
consideration denied, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F 1627 (1977), vacated sub nom., Central
Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, amended, 598 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Cowles Broadcasting, Inc. v. Central Fla. Enters., Inc., 441 U.S.
957 (1979), license granted, Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981).
117. Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d at 430 (dissenting statement of
Chairman Wiley).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 431.
120. Id. at 432-33. The D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's renewal order, finding it
"embarassingly clear" that FCC policies presumed a renewal expectancy for incum-
bents. The court said this philosophy contradicted the congressional intent expressed
in § 309(e) of the Communications Act, and the FCC's renewal criteria outlined in its
1965 Policy Statement. The court found that the FCC conducted a "noncomparative
assessment" when it renewed the incumbent's license despite the superior structural
qualifications of the challenger. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom. Cowles Broadcasting, Inc. v. Central Fla. Enters.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 957 (1978), license granted, Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d
993 (198 1). The court also thought that Chairman Wiley's dissent typified the FCC's
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mitment to meaningful license accountability.121
3. Summary
This overview of FCC licensing procedures demonstrates that the
agency has not committed itself to achieving the goals it established
in the 1965 Policy Statement. The FCC's failure to use its licensing
power in a renewal contest to achieve its principal goal--diversifica-
tion in broadcast ownership' 2 2 -has resulted in unsatisfactory owner-
ship patterns. The next section of this Note examines a major
hostility toward comparative renewal contests, but warned that such an attitude "is
plainly mistaken." Id. at 57.
The court's remand of the proceedings to the agency assured the continuation of
the 12 year litigation over this application. Recently, the FCC again granted Cowles
a license renewal in an opinion that demonstrated its philosophical disagreement with
the D.C. Circuit. The agency affrmed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge
in Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 500 (1980). First, the FCC repeated its
belief that the 1965 Policy Statement distinguishes the approach it takes toward new
license applicant. from renewal proposals. Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d
993, 1006, n.65 (1981). Second, the FCC conceded the challenger's comparative supe-
riority over the incumbent under the diversification and integration criteria. The
agency held, however, that such findings deserve less weight when the licensee has
provided substantial service. Id. at 1012, 1015. Third, the FCC restated the three
traditional justifications for conceding a renewal expectancy to the incumbent: 1) a
challenger cannot guarantee that its paper proposals will match the licensee's proven
performance, and possibly expose the community to inferior service; 2) renewal ex-
pectancies encourage licensees to invest in their facilities; 3) using renewal hearings
to compare incumbents and challengers could result in "haphazard restructuring" of
the group ownership which controls two-thirds of commercial television stations. Id.
at 1013, 1013, n.l. The FCC concluded that "such a restructuring" would not serve
the public interest, especially when it would "arbitrarily [destroy] a proven and ac-
ceptable service." Id. at 1013, 1017. The unsuccessful challenger says it will appeal
the ruling. BROADCASTING, June 22, 1981, at 25.
121. On a typical day when the FCC rubber-stamped renewals for about 200 un-
challenged station licenses of Missouri and Iowa incumbents, FCC Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson dissented. The FCC staff had processed the applications, and sent
memoranda to the Commissioners for "nods" of approval. Johnson said the agency
paid virtually no attention to the licensees' performance or programs to determine if
they had honored their public trust. "For this Commission to sanction such cynical
squandering of the valuable largess it dispenses is a shameful fraud on the public."
Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Television Licenses, 11 F.C.C.2d 809, 810-11
(1968) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Johnson).
122. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394. The FCC made diversification of ownership both a policy
goal and a criterion for comparing mutually exclusive license applicants. The agency
believed that the public benefited from such diversity in a free society that simultane-
ously tolerates government control over access to broadcasting outlets. Id. For dis-
cussion of the unsatisfactory pattern of ownership, see notes 124-82 and
accompanying text infra.
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problem of concentrated ownership-the general failure of urban-
based broadcasters to meet the special needs and interests of diverse
populations. At the end of this discussion, the reader will better un-
derstand that FCC policies have eliminated access to many who are
seeking an interest in a broadcast outlet, and why the LPTV system
present a realistic alternative.
123
B. Concentration of Broadcast Ownershi
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court has declared that the first amendment124 cre-
ates a better-informed public because it stimulates "the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."' 25 Within the broadcasting field, the FCC and the courts
have consistently stated that the industry would reach this optimum
constitutional goal if it granted one license per applicant.1 26 The first
123. During its years of battling the D.C. Circuit over the merits of favoring in-
cumbent licensees with renewal expectancy, the FCC may have occasionally won-
dered what it was fighting for. For example, former Chairman Burch probably
surprised his audience when he told the International Radio and Television Society
on September 14, 1973, "If I were to pose the question, what are the FCC's renewal
policies and what are the controlling guidelines, everyone in this room would be on
equal footing. You couldn't tell me, I couldn't tell you-and no one else at the Com-
mission could do any better." Quoted in COLE & OETTINGER, supra note 104, at 133.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
125. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The Supreme Court
held that the government could prosecute petitioner for alleged violations of antitrust
laws in its news gathering and dissemination operations without abridging freedom of
the press. See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193,
222-23 (1943), where the Supreme Court held that the FCC may apply antitrust laws
to curb network power. The FCC had ordered NBC to divest one of its two networks,
and to limit its ownership of radio stations to one per community.
126. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978)
(FCC may conclude that diversification of ownership will enhance the possibility of
achieving greater diversity of viewpoints); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (first amendment seeks to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas, not to countenance monopolization of the marketplace); Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943) (community is
deprived of good radio service if one qualified operator presents a single service over
two stations); Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 309 U.S. 470,476 (1940) (Commu-
nications Act protects the public, but does not protect broadcasters from competition);
SecondReport and Order in Matter ofRules on Multple Ownersh p, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046,
1050 (1970) (public policy requires regulators to place control of broadcasting into
many hands); First Report and Order in Matter of Rules on Multlle Ownersho, 22
F.C.C.2d 306, 311 (1964) ("... 60 different licensees are more desirable than 50, and
even 51 are more desirable than 50").
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amendment's policy of encouraging diversity in communications ex-
plains the law's tolerance for the allocation of outlets; this attitude is
unique to broadcasting.' 27 Thus, the FCC made diversification of
media ownership a separate, independent licensing objective, 28 be-
lieving that the variety of programming would increase with the
number of licensees.' 29 Stated differently, concentrated ownership in
a system of scarce channels especially offends traditional first amend-
ment values.'
30
2. FCC Policies Toward Diversification
The FCC has attempted to limit the multiple ownership of broad-
cast properties since the beginning of television.' When television
developed' 32 as a new form of broadcast service, the FCC sought to
avoid a repeat of the anarchy that characterized the early history of
radio.' 33 In 1948, the FCC declared a moratorium 34 on the process-
ing of television license applications, and spent the next four years
studying the problems inherent in a system of limited channels. 35 In
127. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 665. For a discussion of the peculiar aspects of
broadcasting that distinguish it from other communication media, see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
128. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394
(1965). See also McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir.
1956), afl'd, 239 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. deniedsub nom. Sacramento Telecast-
ers, Inc. v. McClatchy Broadcasting Co., 353 U.S. 918 (1957) (diversification of media
control is a relevant factor to consider in licensing, and FCC may determine its
significance).
129. See generally United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(upholding rules limiting multiple ownership).
130. The Communications Act gives the FCC power to "encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest." 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976). The
FCC may also "make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain
broadcasting." Id. § 303(i). The Supreme Court said that these provisions allow the
FCC broad discretion to enact policies that best utilize radio's vast potential within a
system of limited resources. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at
219.
131. For an overview of the FCC's early positions on multiple ownership, see
Heckman, Diherspication of Control of the Media of Mass Communication--Policy or
Fallacy?, 42 GEO. L. J. 378, 379-89 (1954).
132. In the late 1940's, 16 television stations were broadcasting programs. Televi-
sion networks, however, were already in existence. COMPAINE, supra note 16, at 65,
80.
133. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
134. Report and Order, FCC 48-2182 (Sept. 30, 1948).
135. For the history of the FCC's study, see Sixth Report and Order, Rules Gov-
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1952, it announced a master plan of license allocations. 136  The
FCC's first priority was to distribute television service to all parts of
the country. 137 After achieving that objective, the agency's next goal
was to offer at least one channel to each state and community. 38 The
D.C. Circuit quickly upheld the FCC's power to draft the plan, 139
and to enforce it'4° as a means of providing maximum service with a
minimum of interference.
Significantly, when the FCC froze 14 ' the processing of television
applications, most license proposals were uncontested. Investors in
television were mostly parties with communications backgrounds-
radio broadcasters and newspaper publishers-who also had the nec-
essary capital to risk on television's survival.' 42 By the time the FCC
lifted the freeze and announced its allocation plan, television was
ready for a rapid growth phase.' 43 The FCC successfully distributed
broadcast service geographically. In doing so, however, the FCC
continued to license new frequencies to operators already controlling
other communication properties. Such owners accelerated their ac-
erning Television Broadcast Stations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905-06 (1952). During the freeze,
716 applications for television licenses were pending before the FCC. See COLE &
OETTINGER, supra note 104, at 24.
136. Sixth Report and Order, Rules Governing Television Broadcast Stations, 17
Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
137. Id. at 3912.
138. Id. The FCC used population to determine distribution of channels to each
community. Cities with at least one million residents received between six and ten,
while progressively smaller communities received disproportionately fewer frequen-
cies. Id.
139. Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir.
1953). See also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (Congress created FCC to regulate radio and
make it available to all people rapidly and efficiently).
140. Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1954). See also FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955)
(FCC may allocate licenses to distribute radio service fairly among communities);
Television Corp. of Michigan v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (FCC must
justify permission it granted to television station to move its facility and deprive town
of service).
141. Report and Order, FCC 48-2182 (Sept. 30, 1948).
142. LPTV should not pose the same economic entry barriers that faced the pio-
neers of full service television. See notes 189-95 and accompanying text infra.
143. In 1953, the year after the FCC lifted the freeze, television grew dynamically.
The FCC authorized 567 licensees to begin operation, more than twice the number it
had approved before the start of the year. Sales of televisions rose 36% in 1953, as
consumers spent almost $385 million on receivers. BROADCASTING, March 23, 1981,
at 101.
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quisitions in the bigger, profitable markets." Some observers ques-
tioned the wisdom of licensing television channels to publishers in
the same market, 45 but the FCC attempted to curb concentrated
ownership only after group owners had established their multiple
holdings. 1
46
The FCC designed its current rules on multiple ownership to con-
trol both national and regional monopolies. 47 A licensee may not
own more than seven of each type of broadcast property.14 8 Thus, it
may control seven AM and seven FM radio stations, and seven tele-
vision stations. Only five of the television properties may be VHF
television stations. 149  The FCC's other ownership rules, "one-to-a-
market" and "duopoly", forbid a licensee from acquiring additional
stations in an area it currently serves. 5° The FCC has also extended
the "duopoly" rule to refuse a license to a newspaper publisher serv-
144. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951) (FCC properly refused license to a local publisher in
mutually exclusive proceeding in favor of party with no ties to the media in the af-
fected area); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (af-
firmed FCC decision to deny license to newspaper that had sought to suppress
competition in advertising and news dissemination).
145. When the FCC started its 1970 rulemaking on broadcast and newspaper af-
filiations, it had to confront 94 television combinations. Thirty-four of these cross-
holdings were in the top 50 markets, and 52 were in the top 100 markets. By 1975, the
number of newspaper licensees in the top 100 markets had increased to 79. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 945, n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
afd in part, rep'd in part, 436 US. 775 (1978).
146. Much of the buying, selling, and trading of commercial TV stations took
place in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The profitability of lucrative, metropolitan
stations encouraged "trading up" for properties in the larger markets, so that from
1956 to 1966, group-owned stations in the top 100 markets increased by nearly 50%.
COMPAINE, supra note 16, at 82-83.
147. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 (1980).
148. Id.
149, Id. at § 73.636.
150. Id. The duopoly rule prohibits a licensee from owning more than one type
of broadcast service in the same area. The FCC adopted the rule in the 1940's when
AM radio was the only broadcast service. See National Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a ffdinpart, rev'd in part, 436 U.S.
775 (1978). The FCC adopted its "one-to-a-market" rule after FM radio and televi-
sion became profitable investments. The rule forbids licensees from owning more
than one broadcast property in a market area. The rule against such multiple hold-
ings applies only to future ownership, and does not require licensees of existing AM-
FM-TV combinations to divest. 22 F.C.C.2d at 307. See also notes 162-78 and ac-
companying text infra.
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ing the proposed broadcast area.' 5 ' The rule also forbids existing
"cross-owners" of newspaper and broadcast properties in the same
area from transferring all of their holdings to the same party except
through inheritance.' Finally, a broadcast licensee that purchases a
daily newspaper has one day to divest itself of the station.15 3
Despite these restrictions on multiple holdings, the concentration
of media ownership has increased in the past twenty-five years and
the trend apparently will continue.' 54 In 1976, multiple license hold-
ers owned or controlled fifty-eight percent of the commercial televi-
sion stations.' 55 This does not, however, accurately reflect the power
of group owners. In the nation's ten largest metropolitan areas,
groups own more than eighty percent of the stations; in the top fifty
population centers, where almost three-fourths of the television audi-
ence lives, groups own or control seventy-three percent of the televi-
sion properties.' 56 The three commercial television networks are the
elite of these group owners. Each owns a profitable VHF television
station in five of the country's largest and most lucrative markets.
They are the only group owners (and consequently the only television
programmers) with holdings that reach more than twenty percent of
the total television audience. 57 The networks are most dominant in
their control of programming. Together, they originate eighty-five
151. Second Report and Order in Matter of Amendment of Rules on Multiple
Ownership, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), reconsidered, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975). The
broadcast duopoly rule does not disqualify a licensee from acquiring stations in other
areas (provided it does not own the maximum number of properties). Similarly, pub-
lishers also may qualify for broadcast licenses in areas that their newspapers do not
serve. 50 F.C.C.2d at 1075. See also note 173 and accompanying text infra.
152. 50 F.C.C.2d at 1076.
153. Id.
154. In 1956, media groups held fewer than 40% of the commercial television sta-
tion licenses. That number increased to about 50% in 1960, and to over 55% in 1966.
COMPAiNE, supra note 16, at 80. From 1957 to 1975, the 15 largest group owners
increased their holdings from 63 to 80 stations. The proportion of group-owned sta-
tions in the top 100 markets leveled off in the mid-1970's because improvements in
UHF technology and receivers attracted new licensees. Holdings remained heavily
concentrated, however, on the more lucrative VHF band. Id. at 83. Newspaper own-
ership of broadcast stations did decrease over the same period of time. Daily newspa-
pers now control about 30% of these stations. Id. at 94.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 81. See also NOLL, PECK, & McGOWAN, supra note 1, at 16.
157. COMPAiNE, supra note 16, at 81.
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percent of the shows in "prime time",' 58 when audiences and adver-
tising revenues are the largest.159 They also produce more than half
of the programs that their affiliated stations present in local time
periods. 6
As mentioned earlier, 6 ' many of these multiple holding situations
developed early in the history of television. While the FCC often
warns against the dangers of concentrated ownership, 162 it has simul-
taneously adopted a curious policy toward these multiple holdings.
In 1975, it voted to apply its ownership rules to a licensee's future
purchases rather than to decentralize broadcast ownership by apply-
ing them to existing combinations.' 63 The FCC's reason for not di-
158. "Prime time" is the four hour period of evening television that runs from
6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in the midwest. See also note 159 infra.
159. NOLL, PECK, & McGOWAN, supra note 1, at 15. A network realizes approxi-
mately $2.8 million per rating point for every hour of its prime time television pro-
gramming that a viewer watches. Thus, the networks strive to present the "least
objectionable programming", hoping to hold the attention of as many people as possi-
ble. One New York advertising executive says television is the best medium for sell-
ing high volume, low price merchandise. A former NBC vice president says that
network executives consider television a medium to market goods, not information,
entertainment, or enlightenment. The former program chief at NBC says the net-
works plan to give the audience a bit of melancholy fake realism. "Then you overlay
that with what I call trash .... It's the ideal content to fit the nature of 'waste time,'
which is what people use the medium for." For a further discussion of the networks'
philosophy toward prime time programming and audiences, see Andrews, Peddling
Prime Time, SAT. REV., June, 1980, at 64.
160. NOLL, PECK, & McGoWAN, supra note 1, at 15.
161. See notes 141-43 and accompanying text supra.
162. See note 126 supra.
163. Second Report and Order, In the Matters of Amendment etc., 50 F.C.C.2d
1046, 1076 (1975). The FCC said divestiture for the sake of diversity would hamper a
station's commitment to serve its community. Commissioners believed that licensees
who acquired properties in other areas would not understand local needs and provide
poorer service. The FCC also feared that mass divestiture would create a shortage of
equity capital that licensees needed for purchases, causing increases in station prices
and interest rates. Finally, the FCC deemed blanket divestiture unfair to many group
licensees with proven records of broadcast service and who bought and sold stations
for reasons other than profit. Id. at 1078.
The FCC did order divestiture in the most "egregious cases" of cross-ownership
(newspaper-broadcasting). These 16 combinations involved owners of both the only
daily newspaper and broadcast station serving a community. The FCC ordered di-
vestiture of these groups within five years, but left 90 newspaper licensees in control
of stations in the communities where they published. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 944-46, n.18.
Recently, one publisher announced plans to divest its local broadcast property de-
spite not qualifying as the owner of an "egregious" combination. Pulitzer Publishing
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vesting media groups at license renewal complements its rationale for
favoring incumbent licensees in comparative hearings. The FCC be-
lieves that "grandfathering", or leaving existing media conglomerates
in place, stabilizes the industry and its ownership." 6
The Supreme Court recently approved the FCC policy opposing
divestiture of media groups. In FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting,1 65 the Court reversed that portion of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinion vacating the FCC rule as it applied to existing combi-
nations, 66 In reinstating the provision against forced divestitures,
167
the Court held that the statute 68 authorizes the FCC to codify its
policy on licensing Y9rocedures, including procedures designed to di-
versify ownership.' I The Court believed that the FCC had rational
reasons for not using its licensing power and ownership rules to dis-
mantle ownership of the broadcast industry. 70 The Court noted that
some media groups had a proven record of serving the public inter-
est, 1 71 and new ownership could not guarantee that it could match
Co. of St. Louis traded its St. Louis VHF television station to Multimedia, Inc. of
Greenville, S.C. in return for two of the latter's southern VHF stations and $8.25
million. Multimedia owns six AM and six FM radio stations, six television stations,
and publishes 35 newspapers. Pulitzer owns four television stations and an AM-FM
combination. By acquiring Multimedia's two VHF stations, Pulitzer would own six
such services. Thus, it must divest itself of one of those properties to comply with
FCC limits on VHF ownership. BROADCASTING, March 23, 1981, at 32. See also
note 149 and accompanying text supra; note 173 infra.
164. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
165. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
166. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 951
(D.C. Cir. 1977), affidinpart, rev'dinpart, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). The D.C. Circuit held
that previous decisions of the Supreme Court provided the FCC with authority to
prospectively ban media combinations. Id. at 951. See, e.g., United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (upholds ban on cross-cable ownership);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1956) (upheld numer-
ical limits on station ownership in the public interest). The court also declared that
the FCC could move against these combinations without first proving they were
harmful. It said that the three-year renewable license does not create a vested prop-
erty right in a licensee that insulates it from agency accountability. The court noted
that divestiture would increase the likelihood that different viewpoints would serve
the public. 555 F.2d at 962-63.
167. 436 U.S. at 805.
168. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
169. 436 U.S. at 793-94.
170. Id. at 806-08.
171. Id. at 806. See also Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (petition to challenge renewal denied for failing to submit facts that
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that performance in short- and long-term commitments.172 The
Court also suggested that divesting newspaper publishers of their
licenses might decrease the quality of local programming. 173 The
Court said publishers would trade their broadcast properties to main-
tain their interests in lucrative stations, resulting in licensees that
were less familiar with their new broadcast markets.'74 Finally, the
Court rebuked the foundation of both Greater Boston 175 and Citizens
show specific abuses of multiple ownership). In Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1970), the court upheld the FCC's denial of a hearing to Salt Lake City residents who
opposed the renewal of an AM radio station license. The station was part of an AM-
FM-TV combination. The corporation that owned the station was a subsidiary of the
Mormon Church, which published one of the city's two daily newspapers. The
Church also owns Brigham Young University, which in turn owns a license for a TV-
FM complex in Provo, Utah. The court said that the opponents of media concentra-
tion must do more than generalize. They must also prove specific injury in order to
warrant a hearing. Id. at 558-59.
Challengers in a license contest have a tactical disadvantage when the FCC accepts
evidence of incumbent performance. These opponents have no record of their own to
offer in rebuttal. Others doubt the reliability of program records as an accurate meas-
ure of competency. The FCC gathers its own data on broadcaster performance by
selecting a "composite week" of seven days from the three year license period. Com-
missioners evalute the programs the licensee presents in this period, which often pro-
vides a misleading indication of actual performance. See COLE & OETrINGER, supra
note 104, at 134-35.
172. 436 U.S. at 806-07. See also Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204,
206 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956) (TV license awarded to news-
paper publisher for program proposal deemed a more reliable guide to fulfillment of
future performance based on communications record). Multi-station licensees in
large markets may also have an advantage over single station owners. They can bar-
gain for better prices against networks, national advertising salespeople, and in-
dependent program supplies. Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry:
Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DUKE L.J. 282, 287, n.20.
173. 436 U.S. at 808.
174, Id. at 813-14. In other words, if newspapers can hold broadcast licenses, the
law prefers that these combinations exist in one geographic area, as most now operate.
See note 119 supra. The companies that recently announced they would swap sta-
tions apparently believed it safer to divest of local holdings. See note 164 supra.
Earlier, when publishers could not anticipate the policy toward local cross-owner-
ship, two such licensees conducted a similar trade. The parent corporation of the
Detroit Evening News traded the license of its local television station to the Washing-
ton Post Corp. in return for that company's local station license and two million dol-
lars in cash. The two stations were worth an estimated $50-100 million each, and the
companies said that they wanted to plan their future TV operations "more surely and
securely." Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1977, p. 19, col. 1. The FCC approved the exchange
without comment. Assignments and Transfers, 67 F.C.C.2d 1609 (1978).
175. See notes 92-98 and accompanying text supra.
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Communications Center,7 "6 holding that the FCC may properly dis-
tinguish the license renewal contest from a hearing involving mutu-
ally exclusive applicants for a new frequency. 177 Thus, the Court
concluded that the FCC could downplay the significance of diversifi-
cation when considering a renewal candidate. 71
This discussion demonstrates that both the FCC and the Supreme
Court accept group ownership of the scarce broadcast channels. One
researcher of media ownership patterns found no tangible proof of
harm resulting from multiple ownership.1 7 9 Supporters of curbing
concentration reply that thepotential for restricted competition in ad-
vertising and programming requires prophylactic action.'8 0 As Judge
Tamm of the D.C. Circuit stated, "[T]his creeping growth of media
cartels and conglomerates is likely to produce even more bland and
homogeneous intellectual fare ... " than broadcasting currently
offers.181
This Note cannot resolve the debate over the effect of multiple
ownership on television programming. It does suggest that group
holdings frustrate the congressional intent to diversify control of tele-
vision. To the extent that the FCC's regulatory policies have en-
couraged these ownership patterns, the agency bears the
responsibility for shutting off the access of newcomers to television
ownership. The decision of the agency, with the Supreme Court's
approval, not to disturb existing ownership patterns has left a small
number of licensees in control of the vast number of stations, particu-
larly in metropolitan areas.
176. See notes 92-102 and accompanying text supra.
177. 436 U.S. at 810-11.
178. Id. at 810. The Court said the FCC's policy toward multiple ownership
never intended to disrupt local service. The Court opined that the agency's concen-
tration of control rules in the 1940's, those affirmed in Storer, and the 1972 duopoly
and one-to-a-market rules, all discouraged divestiture of existing combinations. Id.
179. COMPAINE, supra note 16, at 86-87. The author also cites a Rand Corp. study
that concluded that the effect of media concentration is not yet proven. Id. at 100.
180. Commission to Designate for Hearing Applications to Acquire Interests in a
Second VHF Station in Major Markets, 45 F.C.C. 1851 (1964). The title of the Notice
reflects the FCC's concern about such holdings. The agency believed it necessary to
hold hearings on applications that would increase a licensee's existing holdings in the
top 50 markets. Specifically, the FCC ordered a hearing if the applicant either had a
station and wanted a license for a second facility, or if it owned no properties but was
seeking two or more licenses. See also NOLL, PECK, & MCGOWAN, supra note 1, at
107.
181. Hall v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring).
(Vol. 23:189
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/5
LOW POWER TELEVISION
The inescapable conclusion is that broadcast television today is not
the "uninhibited marketplace of ideas" that the first amendment sup-
posedly fosters in our communication systems. The current system
locks out public interest organizations, neighborhood groups, minori-
ties, and others whose interests television ownership would serve.
For these and other similar groups, access to broadcast television
ownership and control depends on government policies that open the
airwaves to new outlets for a reasonable price. 8 ' The FCC's new
low power television service may offer those opportunities.
IV. Low POWER TELEVISION
A. Introduction
LPTV is a new television service183 that has the capability to open
182. Existing, qualified broadcasters may contest the efforts of newcomers to bid
for available licenses. Cable television's ability to provide its subscribers with dozens
of channels has posed a competitive threat to the three broadcasting networks and
their local affiliates. A top official at ABC Television says cable has made the current
multiple ownership rules obsolete, and burdensome on this industry. "If cable opera-
tors are free to program up to 78 channels in as many outlets as they wish, then surely
broadcasters should not be limited to one channel in seven markets." Address by
Leonard H. Goldenson, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., Nat'l Press Club (Sept. 17, 1980), reprinted in 1980 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 57, 59. Goldenson offered a six-point program to amend FCC
rules, including the abolition of multiple ownership rules and restrictions on newspa-
per holdings.
183. On August 8, 1978, the FCC initiated its study of Low Power Television in
Notice of Inquiry, 68 F.C.C.2d 1525 (1978). In its order, the FCC said its goal was to
increase "diversity of programming to both rural and urban areas." .d. Following a
two-year study, the agency's staff determined that technological advances, the
shortage of television channels (particularly in metropolitan areas), and the public's
desire for more program choices justified the creation of LPTV. See generally RE-
PORT, supra note 50. The FCC relied on the staff report to quickly initiate a rulemak-
ing procedure on the new LPTV service. Inquiry into the Future Role of Low-Power
Television Broadcasting and Television Translators in the National Telecommunica-
tions System, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 45 Fed. Reg. 69178 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Notice of Proposed Rule Making]. The FCC completed its Report and
Order on March 4, 1982, voting to establish the LPTV service effective June 17, 1982.
In its final rulemaking, the Commission set three goals for LPTV: (1) to achieve a
fuller utilization of the broadcast spectrum; (2) to make broadcasting more responsive
to consumers; and (3) to "open the regulatory doors to purveyors of alternate technol-
ogies." Inquiry Into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Tel-
evision Translators in the National Telecommunications System, Final Rule, 47 Fed.
Reg. 21468 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Final Rule]. See also News Release of Federal
Communication Commission, in Washington, D.C. (March 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Release].
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new broadcasting outlets to persons inadequately served by the pres-
ent structure of the television industry. The FCC will provide for
LPTV by amending its current rules on broadcast translators.18 4
Translators historically have offered television service to geographi-
cally isolated or sparsely populated areas that could not support local
television.' 85 The translator plays a passive role, receiving the signal
of one station and transmitting it locally on another channel.'86
LPTV will operate on VHF and UHF frequencies at a fraction of
the power that full-service stations use to transmit.'87 The "low
power" that the new mini-stations require for signal transmission will
enable them to broadcast on channels that television sets are capable
of receiving, without interfering with signals that present stations
send. ' In fact, the FCC now believes that technological ad-
vances' 89 have made it feasible to expand translator service into net-
184. 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.701-801 (1980). See also Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
supra note 183, at 69178.
185. See In the Matter of the Rules Governing Television Broadcast Translator
Stations, 13 F.C.C.2d 305 (1968). For the history of the development of the television
translator, see REPORT, supra note 50, at 5-22.
186. Translators may broadcast limited material, only in exceptional situations
such as emergencies, and for a maximum of 30 seconds per hour of photographs,
slides, and recorded appeals for operating funds. 47 C.F.R. § 74.731(f) (1980).
187. LPTV stations and translators will broadcast at 100 watts of power on VHF,
and 1,000 watts on UHF. Release, supra note 183. By comparison, a full power UHF
station transmits at up to five million watts. Wall St. J., May 28, 1980, p. 14, col. 2. A
100,000 watt VHF station, the maximum for that type of service, can cover a radius of
60 miles; a VHF LPTV signal will travel 10 to 15 miles. Id. Sept. 10, 1980, p. 2, col. 2.
188. The FCC has assigned LPTV stations "secondary" status. Final Rule, supra
note 183, at 21471. Secondary status, by definition, makes the rights of existing and
new full-service stations superior to LPTV. The consequences, therefore, are: (1) if
an LPTV station interferes will a full-service station's signal, it must correct the prob-
lem or leave the air;, (2) if a new full-service stations interferes with an existing LPTV
signal, the LPTV station must yield the airspace. Id.
The FCC staff says translator interference has not posed a problem for broadcast-
ers. The agency has received only two complaints about the 2,400 licensed VHF
translators. The staff believes low power licensees can easily avoid interference
problems by carefully selecting their antenna sites and channel locations. Most LPTV
stations will probably broadcast on UHF, where fewer operating stations will de-
crease the chance of interference. See REPORT, supra note 50, at 125-26. See also
notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
189. New low-cost videotape players, improved circuitry, and advances in satellite
technology should make equipment more manageable in size and cost, while provid-
ing reliable, inexpensive program services. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra
note 183, at 69181. Equipment manufacturers expect to reap a bonanza from their
products in the next three years, especially in the design of 1,000-watt UHF stations
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work,"9  regional, and local LPTV systems.' 91  If LPTV can
successfully convert passive translators into original programming
television stations, it will open the saturated broadcast frequencies to
new facilities and help the FCC fulfil the congressional goal of effi-
cient utilization of the limited broadcast airwaves.'
92
B. The Potential of LPTV
1. A Chance to Diversify Control of Mass Media
As this Note has discussed, the FCC steadfastly refuses to restruc-
ture television ownership through license proceedings, its only avail-
able mechanism.' 93 The new LPTV service would not displace the
media conglomerates that now control so many television stations,
particularly in the cities. The technology would, however, force these
group owners to share the television airwaves with new and creative
station owners and managers.' 94 Current licensees may face new
competition for their viewers' attention. The FCC says, however,
that will dominate LPTV service in metropolitan areas. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 13,
1980, at 62.
190. FCC Chairman Fowler hopes LPTV will lead to a fourth network. See Wall
St. J., Mar. 5, 1982, at p. 8, col. 3.
191. REPORT, supra note 50, at 34.
192. The paramount issue before the FCC, as it reviewed its lengthy administra-
tive record on LPTV, was whether it should create the new broadcast service. The
record convinced the Commissioners that they should proceed. Generally, the federal
government, broadcast and cable industries, and scores of private and public interest
organizations overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of low power facilities. The FCC
remarked, "What is most noteworthy is the paucity of direct opposition to the concept
of a lower power television service." Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21470. Former
FCC Chairman Charles Ferris, who ran the agency when the LPTV study begun,
believed that LPTV's potential for new programs, relatively low startup and opera-
tional costs, and ability to program to a targeted audience offers new opportunities to
those who cannot afford access to full service television. Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, supra note 183, at 69191.
193. See notes 17-182 and accompanying textsupra. For a summary of the FCC's
current philosophy on license renewal policy, see note 120 supra.
194. For example, the Missouri Public Interest Research Group (MOPIRG) has
applied for a UHF low power facility in St. Louis, Missouri. MOPIRG is one mem-
ber of "Media Access Group," a coalition of 47 community and public interest orga-
nizations in the metropolitan area dedicated to the discussion of public issues. Other
members of "Media Access Group" include the Gray Panthers, American Friends
Service Committee, Common Cause, The St. Louis Tenants Union, Solar Energy As-
sociation, and the Archdiocese of the St. Louis Human Rights Office. MOPIRG pro-
poses to use its LPTV station to provide its audience with information on community
issues, to offer interested persons access to the stations, and to provide a variety of
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that it will not allow LPTV to harm the stability of the broadcast
industry or the investments of its licensees.
195
Clearly, LPTV has generated excitement for those who have
sought access to a television outlet but experienced frustration in try-
ing to acquire a broadcast license or station. Interested parties have
flooded the FCC with applications for LPTV operating permits.
196
Three factors help to explain the interest of potential licensees. First,
the agency has undoubtedly encouraged such a response with pro-
posed rules that make financing and operating a mini-station rela-
tively easy.197 An operator will decide the type and amount of
services such as college speaker series, debates, and to trade programs with other
LPTV stations. Application of MOPIRG for LPTV Service, at 12-13.
195. REPORT, supra note 50, at 3. BROADCASTING, the influential trade journal,
has attacked LPTV in editorials since the FCC announced it would propose rules for
the service. The magazine aimed its attack primarily at former Chairman Fernis'
"laissez-faire" attitude toward the industry. BROADCASTING, Sept. 29, 1980, at 90
(FCC undertaking pays less attention to broadcast engineering than to social engi-
neering, "with no more than an academic knowledge of the marketplace"); id. Sept. 8,
1980, at 78 ("motives of the manipulators of LPTV are utterly transparent"-they are
political).
These new channels, however, might eventually benefit full-service broadcasters.
With additional outlets, unpopular regulations such as the Fairness Doctrine may
become obsolete. The FCC would probably find any rules based on the scarcity ra-
tionale difficult to justify. Lively & Leahy, Government and the Media: Regulating a
First.4mendment Value System, 31 FLA. L. REv. 913, 930 (1979).
Regardless of the benefit of LPTV, these new outlets should not threaten broadcast-
ers. LPTV's secondary status and its limited audiences should not cause much eco-
nomic unsettling for the powerful signals of full service, commercial stations. See
note 188 and accompanying text supra.
196. In September, 1980, the FCC established interim procedures to process
translator applications until it could complete the rulemaking process. Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, supra note 183, at 69190. The FCC imposed a series of deadlines
for applications, allowing interested parties to apply for channels, but automatically
rejecting those who filed after the time limit expired. Id. Within months, this proce-
dure proved inadequate as more than 5,000 applicants filed for low power translator
service. In response to this overwhelming demand, the FCC voted to freeze the appli-
cation process to allow its staff timne to separate for processing and approving the
uncontested applications. FCC Order 81-173 (Apr. 9, 1981). With more than 6,500
applications now awaiting processing, and possibly 12,000 additional applicants
awaiting removal of the freeze, the FCC has decided not to lift the moratorium until
it can reduce the backlog. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21469, 21472. See Wanll St.
J., Mar. 5, 1981, at p. 8, col. 3. The FCC will attempt to reduce the backlog by group-
ing the applications in three tiers, and processing each tier in order, beginning with
the most rural applications. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21472.
197. See generally Final Rule, supra note 183. See also Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, supra note 183, at 69181. The agency believes it can relax operating stan-
dards because the new service will not harm existing television stations. Id. at 69182.
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programming it would provide, 9 8 and the manner in which it will
generate financial support.' 99 Second, LPTV licensees will risk less
by investing in the new service than did the full-service television
pioneers.2 °" Third, television has succeeded as an industry20 1 and
See also note 188 supra. The FCC, however, would break from current translator
rules by requiring a qualified translator engineer to supervise LPTV-originated pro-
gramming. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 183, at 69181, n.16. The
FCC would hold LPTV stations to statutory obligations such as prohibitions on
broadcasting obscenities and lottery information. Licensees, however, would comply
with only minimal demands under the Fairness Doctrine, equal time provisions, and
access rules for federal electoral candidates. Release, supra note 183. See 47 U.S.C.
§315 (1976).
198. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21470-71. The basis of this "hands-off' policy
is the FCC's belief that LPTV is well-suited to target programs to local interests. The
Commission believes that these interests form a "marketplace" of service goals. The
Commission believes that the public can receive maximum service from LPTV by
keeping regulation of programming to a minimum. Id. The agency staff also believes
that sufficient programming exists to supplement locally originated material. In 1978,
the available supply of programming included 5,000 series, 18 special non-broadcast
satellite services such as movie and sports channels, and religious and family pro-
gramming. REPORT, supra note 50, at 173.
199. Id. at 29-31. An operator could tap a variety of financial resources: local
contributions from civic-minded organizations; advertising sales; a government-cre-
ated television tax district; and subscription sales. For example, MOPIRG has budg-
eted just under $50,000 for startup and temporary operating costs. It has secured a
bank loan for part of the cost, and other members of "Media Access Group" have
pledged assistance. MOPIRG hopes to institute some subscription service to defray
special program costs. Application of MOPIRG for LPTV Service, at 15-16.
200. Ironically, the FCC defends its questionable rules on network and multiple
ownership of LPTV stations as a way to bring industry expertise into the new system.
Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21489. In an editorial attack on LPTV, BROADCASTING
predicted that "hundreds, even thousands of venturers will rally" to Ferris' "exploita-
tion of the new service, without any guarantee of survival." BROADCASTING, Sept. 15,
1980, at 114. The industry deserves credit for expressing concern over those who
gamble on an LPTV station. It might calm its fears by remembering the experience of
the first investors in its field. As discussed earlier, these individuals risked entering a
business of which they were ignorant, in a climate of cynicism about television's abil-
ity to survive. See notes 2, 141-42, and accompanying text supra. Investors entering
LPTV also do not know whether the new service will succeed, but they have an ad-
vantage over their television predecessors: they know the public trusts and desires
more television service. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
During his term as FCC Chairman, Ferris advocated as much freedom for broad-
casting as the limited systems would tolerate. "If a company has the money to invest
in a telecommunications source, let it, and leave it to the public to determine whether
the service will survive." BROADCASTING, Jan. 19, 1981, at 37. Ferris developed his
market philosophy while adhering to the traditional concept that broadcasters in a
system of scarce frequencies serve as the trustees of the public's airwaves. As dis-
cussed earlier, current Chairman Fowler advocates abandoning this traditional ap-
proach to broadcasting. Fowler also recognizes the entrepreneur's role in
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has become an important part of life.20 2 A carefully planned and
managed metropolitan LPTV station that offers specialized program
alternatives to meet the needs of diverse audiences should succeed. If
it does, it will help broadcasting achieve the important first amend-
ment goal of offering the public a variety of program choices.
203
2. Providing the Best Practicable Service
If LPTV succeeds in diversifying control of television, it may also
achieve the second regulatory goal of offering the best practicable tel-
evision service. Those who seek mini-stations to serve particular
community needs presumably would dedicate themselves to their
specialized audience, and program accordingly. Management that
understands a particular community would also respond more sensi-
tively to the viewers' changing needs than to the absentee licensees of
many full-service television stations.
204
A survey of the parties who participated in the FCC study of
LPTV demonstrates the potential that mini-stations have for offering
unique programming. Many respondents believe LPTV can offer a
variety of services to urban residents: rental assistance; education for
bedridden elderly; adult counseling; public discussions; amateur the-
ater; musical performances; local government proceedings; high
school drama and athletic events; and general access to the broadcast
facility.2" 5 One might reasonably conclude that interested parties who
look to television as a source of programming for these various pro-
posals now lament television's current catering to bland, mass audi-
broadcasting, but he supports replacing government allocations of frequencies under
the "trustee" model with a total market approach to access. See note 106 and accom-
panying text supra. Fowler recognizes the potential of LPTV, see note 190 stevra, and
the FCC expects market forces to dictate the operational and structural composition
of LPTV. Release, supra note 183.
201. See notes 3-4, 51; 159, and accompanying text supra.
202. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
203. See 1965 Policy Statement, I F.C.C.2d at 396. See also National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aJ'd in part,
rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (FCC acts properly when it attempts to promote
diversity by allocating stations to those without control over an alternative major me-
dia voice); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 42 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (because radio and television consume mas-
sive portions of America's time, we must assure that the public has access to varied
information so that it may remain an intelligent group).
204. See Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21470.
20. See REPORT, supra note 50, Attachment A, at 7-10.
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ence tastes.2°
C. Ownersho Criteria
The FCC's final rules on LPTV ownership 7 reflect the agency's
interest in diversification. Commendably, the FCC will not subject
LPTV applicants to the time-consuming and expensive comparative
hearing process that mutually exclusive applicants for new broadcast
licenses have faced.2"' Instead, the applicants will proceed to a "pa-
per hearing," with applicants submitting written evidence of their
qualifications .0 9 The Administrative Law Judge will have discretion
206. Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow gained instant notoriety in his first
public address as agency chief when he attacked the quality of television. Minow
chose as his audience the National Association of Broadcasters, the industry's trade
organization and chief lobbyist in Washington. Minow's famous line, labelling televi-
sion programming "a vast wasteland," overshadowed his plea for a more diversified
programming mix:
There are many people in this great country and you must serve all of us. You
will get no argument from me if you say that, given a choice between a western
and a symphony, more people will watch the western .... We all know that peo-
ple would more often prefer to be entertained than stimulated or informed. But
your obligations are not satisfied if you look only to popularity as a test of what
to broadcast.
Address by Chairman Minow, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters Convention (1961), re-
printedin 27 Vital Speeches of the Day 533, 535 (1961). See also Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 200 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (any person wanting to market a product has direct, personal, and instan-
taneous audience to the electronic media, but not so for one seeking to discuss a social
issue); NOLL, PECK, & McGOWAN, supra note 1, at 48 (the present system tends to
produce programming for a mass audience, neglecting the demands of viewers with
special tastes).
207. The FCC considered three criteria for comparing mutually exclusive LPTV
applicants. It would have given preference to 1) the applicant that filed first; 2) an
applicant with at least 50% minority control; and 3) noncommercial applicants. No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 183, at 69189-90. Commendably, it has
abandoned the "firstness" and noncommercial preference criteria. Final Rule, supra
note 183, at 21485. Neither criterion furthered the FCC's goal of program and owner-
ship diversification, and the bias against commercial applicants may have eliminated
important sources of finance.
208. Id. at 21484-85. The staff believes that the comparative hearing would waste
time and money for a limited service such as LPTV. The staff compared the idea to
"a requirement that the U.S. Supreme court grant certiorari in all cases involving
parking tickets." REPORT, supra note 50, at 251. Congress recently amended the
Communications Act to replace the comparative hearing with a lottery system for
awarding new, full-service licenses. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1976), as amendedby Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1242(a)(i)(1), 95 Stat. 357.
209. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21485.
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to order pre-hearing discovery, or oral testimony.21° The hearing will
evaluate the merits of the applicants based on two comparative crite-
ria. A brief discussion of each requirement follows.
1. Diversification of Media Control
In a license contest between mutually exclusive applicants, the
FCC will accord a preference to the party that will best further the
goal of diversifying "control of the media of mass communica-
tions. '2 While the definitions of the terms and the mechanics of
applying the preference are not yet defined,212 presumably the appli-
cant controlling the fewest number of communication outlets wiln re-
ceive the LPTV license.
This diversification-oriented preference may help to offset a sepa-
rate, distressing rule for LPTV ownership. The agency will not re-
strict the number of LPTV licenses that a party may hold.213 The
FCC justifies this position based on the nature of LPTV. As opera-
tors of secondary facilities, LPTV licensees will likely operate on low-
profit margins. 214 Additionally, mini-stations supposedly do not raise
the same concerns about monopolization that full-service stations
do.215  Commissioner Washburn correctly argued, however, that
ownership limitations would encourage more diversity of control and
viewpoints.216 In addition, multiple LPTV holdings pose the same
210. Id.
211. Id. at 21486.
212. See note 183 supra.
213. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21488-89. It also will not forbid current
broadcast licensees, cable operators, and newspaper publishers from owning the sta-
tions. Finally, the three commercial networks may own low power stations. Id. The
FCC accepted the contention of local broadcasters and the networks that their exper-
tise would benefit the fledgling low power industry. The Commission also believed
that multiple ownership would facilitate the production of better programming. The
Commission thought that the diversification of ownership criterion for awarding
LPTV licences would adequately protect newcomers to the industry in contests
against current broadcasters. Finally, the FCC felt assured by the variety of appli-
cants in the 7,000 license requests that concentrated ownership was not "considered a
serious or dangerous enough possibility to warrant structural restraints in ownership."
Id. at 21488.
214. See note 199 supra. The FCC is warning applicants that "a low-power li-
cense may not be a license to print money." Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21493.
215. See notes 147-60 and accompanying text supra.
216. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 183, at 69191-92 (concurring
statement of Commissioner Washburn).
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problems that group ownership of full-service stations present.21 7
2. Preference for Minorities
Under the second evaluative criterion, the FCC will grant prefer-
ence at the "paper hearing" stage to an applicant having at least fifty
percent minority control.2 18 The agency deserves credit for encour-
aging such participation in view of the disproportionate lack of mi-
nority ownership of full-service broadcasting.21 9 Mass media in
urban areas has not done all it can to meet the special needs of mi-
nority groups, particularly blacks and native Americans.220
The FCC certainly should consider minority participation in its
evaluation of mutually exclusive candidates, but making minority
participation one of two equal criteria may arbitrarily and unfairly
eliminate others with legitimate needs for a station.22  Rather than
structuring LPTV ownership and service on a quota system, the FCC
should consider the structural qualifications outlined in its 1965 Pol-
icy Statement.222 In cities with large minority populations, the repre-
sentatives of these groups would probably qualify under these
217. See generally notes 131-82 and accompanying text supra.
218. Final Rule, supra note 183, at 21486.
219. Minorities comprise 20% of the nation's population but control less than one
percent of the broadcast properties. COMPAINE, supra note 16, at 78.
220. The United States Commission on Civil Rights blames a lack of capital and
FCC procedures that deny minority groups access to license applications for the low
percentage of black television control. See United States Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort 278 (1971). See also Garrett v. FCC, 513
F.2d 1056, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (black ownership and participation would likely
result in responsive programming to black citizens); TV-9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929,
936 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. TV-9,
Inc., 419 U.S. 986 (1974) (law does not foreclose consideration of black ownership in
comparative license hearing).
In some cities, television and other media may not adequately serve substantial
native American populations. See Nat'l Geographic, Nov. 1980, at 674-77 (discussion
of the problems of 20,000 native Americans living in Minneapolis and St. Paul,
Minnesota).
221. Commissoner Fogarty imagined such a situation in the following hypotheti-
cal: blacks controlling two LPTV stations in Detroit apply for a third new facility.
An applicant from the nearby city of Hamtramack, which has a large Polish popula-
tion, also seeks the license. If the FCC applies its two proposed paper hearing crite-
ria, the blacks would win the license. The result probably would not further the
public interest in LPTV service in the general area. Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
supra note 183, at 69193 (concurring statement of Commissioner Fogarty).
222. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d at 393.
See also notes 78-86 and accompanying text supra.
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structural criteria without unfairly eliminating others from considera-
tion through a quota system.
V. CONCLUSION
Broadcast television represents a powerful tool of mass communi-
cation that serves important societal interests. The technological lim-
itations of the broadcast airwaves, and the FCC's failure to carry out
congressional intent in regulating the industry, have combined to se-
verely limit access to this medium. Thus, most persons play a passive
role of watching programming that others produce elsewhere to serve
mass tastes. Low power television has the potential, as an alternative
to the current industry, to create hundreds, and perhaps thousands of
new facilities that could meet the specialized needs of a diverse popu-
lation. The FCC designed its LPTV ownership rules to further the
diversification of control over broadcast communication, and to en-
courage minority group ownership. These rules have the potential
for creative development of the service despite the FCC's questiona-
ble decision not to restrict multiple LPTV holdings. As the FCC be-
ings to administer this exciting new broadcast service, it must
recognize its forty-eight year old responsibility of ensuring that
broadcasting serves thepublic interest, convenience, and necessity.
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